Germany learns to be a team player

Benjamin Tallis is a senior research fellow at the German Council on Foreign Relations, where he heads the “Action Group Zeitenwende.”

With Germany under pressure to deliver on its stuttering Zeitenwende — the promised sea change in its defense policy — any progress is now welcome. And this is the view not just in Berlin, but in all allied capitals where policymakers understand what such a change could mean for NATO and European defense.

It’s true that Germany has come a long way since February 2022, moving from the shameful 5,000 helmets to become a major supplier of heavy weapons to Ukraine. Yet, this has largely been in response to severe pressure from allies. And, too often, Berlin has continued to act alone in its naked and short-term self-interest, which has repeatedly aggravated its partners and will do Germany no favors in the long-term.

Therefore, it’s refreshing that a new procurement deal for Main Battle Tanks (MBTs) seems to show that Germany is learning lessons. This deal not only promises some much-needed good news, but it also shows that Berlin is starting to think more like a team player.

When Germany finally agreed to send Leopard 2 MBTs to Ukraine in January, it triggered thoughts about how these tanks would be replaced as part of the country’s rearmament. Other countries that sent tanks, or realized they needed to upgrade their military capabilities, were thinking similar things.

Thus, the stage was set for a bonanza of common procurement, reestablishing the Leopard 2 as the European tank platform — a development that would have benefits not only for German industry but also for the interoperability of NATO forces. Having such a common platform allows for easier communal training, joint exercises, as well as integrated supply chains and repair networks.

This became particularly important after Poland had rejected the Leopard in favor of procuring a huge amount of American Abrams (250) and South Korean K2 Black Panther (up to 1,000) MBTs. Undoubtedly, there’s merit in strengthening defense cooperation across the democratic world rather than just within Europe, but Warsaw’s choice revealed wider problems that, if left unchecked, would threaten to undermine European defense in the long run.

Poland’s decision had a lot to do with — to put it mildly — the political differences between the current governments in Warsaw and Berlin. And these differences were exacerbated by the two countries’ very different approaches to supporting Ukraine in the early stages of the war.

While Poland took a vocal and leading role, Germany initially seemed timid and reluctant in its support. It was a stance that extended into the long-running saga over supplying “Western-designed” MBTs to Ukraine, with Berlin blocking the necessary reexport licenses for its partners to send over Leopards — let alone sending them itself.

And when Berlin finally caved on sending tanks in January, having dragged Washington into the coalition, it left lingering mistrust, compounding existing concerns over technology transfer and value sharing. The German government and its leading arms manufacturers seemed reluctant to hand over the latest tech for their partners to use in their own manufacture, and they appeared determined to keep most of the financial benefit from any deals. South Korea, by contrast, agreed to transfer technology and locate a significant amount of production in Poland, creating local jobs and sharing value.

After finally sending 18 Leopard 2A6 variants to Ukraine, the German government then announced it would be replacing them and putting together a collective procurement coalition, raising questions for many allies as to what the conditions would be. The initial signs weren’t promising, with the government in Berlin and manufacturer Krauss Maffei Wegmann (KMW) seemingly intent on keeping production at home.

This, in turn, sowed doubt in the mind of senior officials in the Czech Republic, a key potential participant in the deal. The first to break the taboo and send MBTs to Ukraine in late March 2022 — even ahead of Poland — the Czech Republic needs a large number of modern replacements. And as a country highly economically entangled with Germany, it’s acutely aware of the limitations of doing the hard work, only to see profit and value head back over the border.

Czech decision-makers were thus determined this shouldn’t happen again and so gathered coalition partners, including Lithuania, to make a compelling case for sharing production and value across purchasing countries. They emphasized the operational benefits, as well as the economic advantages of a higher overall order — such as serial production, economies of scale, higher monthly delivery rates — and the willingness of KMW’s Korean competitors to offer a good deal.

And it seems to have worked.

The deadline for requesting the standardized tanks — the most advanced variant of the Leopard 2 — was last week, and it looks likely that the German government’s framework contract for an initial 18 Leopard 2A8s, later going up to 123, will most likely be joined by an order of 77 tanks from the Czech Republic, 54 from Lithuania, as many as 133 from Italy and an undisclosed number, believed to be several dozen, from the Netherlands. Crucially, the Czech Republic expects to host a production line for its own and the Lithuanian tanks, with Italy likely benefiting from a similar arrangement for its own order.

The framework contracts for these orders would begin later in 2023 or early 2024, with the first tanks set for delivery in three years’ time. Potentially amounting to over 400 tanks worth billions of euros, these would be added to the 54 ordered earlier this year by Norway and an ongoing provision for the Hungarian armed forces. Reestablishing the Leopard 2 as Europe’s Panzer of choice, it will benefit both Germany and allies down the road.

More importantly, however, the breakthrough in this forthcoming multi-state deal shows that Germany has woken up to the importance of being a team player, while realizing that if “more Europe” only means “more Germany,” then it won’t happen. And if Berlin can spread this approach across other sectors, it has the potential to reboot the Zeitenwende — and European defense along with it.

* The author is grateful for the research assistance provided by Jannik Hartmann.